Federalism in 1891: autonomy, taxes and the Republic’s uneven map

The federalism of 1891 decentralized taxes and gave the states the export duty, the most unequally distributed tax base in the country. Autonomy and asymmetry were born together: municipalities were left without a revenue of their own listed in the…

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Gravura em ouro-velho sobre fundo verde-floresta: carvalho completo cercado de colunas de alturas diferentes, balança, livros e placa irregular. / Antique gold engraving on deep forest green: a complete oak surrounded by columns of uneven height, a scale, books and an irregular plaque.

The Republic was born federative on the paper of the first day. Decree No. 1, of 15 November 1889, proclaimed the “Federative Republic,” turned the provinces into states and stated that each one, “in the exercise of its legitimate sovereignty,” would decree its Constitution and elect deliberative bodies and local governments. The Constitution of 24 February 1891 confirmed that choice: the nation adopted the Federative Republic “by perpetual and indissoluble union of its former provinces” (Article 1). In practice, though, autonomy means sharing out powers, taxes and risks. In 1891 that sharing favoured the exporting states and left the municipalities without a revenue base of their own.

What the Union kept and what the states took

The Constitution drew a federation of rigid lists. To the Union belonged, exclusively, the tax on foreign imports, duties on the entry, departure and stay of ships, stamp duties (with the exception of the state stamp) and the charges of the federal posts and telegraphs (Article 7). It was also a private competence of the Union to institute issuing banks and to create custom-houses. Federal taxes were to be uniform for all the states.

To the states belonged the power to decree taxes on the export of goods of their own production, on rural and urban real estate, on the transfer of property and on industries and professions (Article 9). Paragraph 2 of the same article exempted from tax, in the state through which they were exported, the products of the other states. Article 11 forbade transit taxes through the territory of a state, or on passage from one state to another, on products of other states or of foreign countries. There was, then, an attempt to stop the federation from breaking up into internal custom-houses. Article 12, on the other hand, allowed the Union and the states to create other sources of revenue, cumulatively or not, provided they did not contradict that allocation.

The municipalities were given no tax competence of their own. The charter confined itself to saying that the states would organize themselves “in such a form that the autonomy of the municipalities shall be assured, in everything that concerns their peculiar interest” (Article 68). Municipal autonomy was declared, but it came with no fiscal base. That gap helps explain coronelismo later on: the municipality depended politically on the state that appointed officials and distributed resources.

The states also received the mines and vacant public lands (terras devolutas) situated in their territories (Article 64) and, in general, “any and every power or right” not denied to them by an express clause or by one implicitly contained in the express clauses of the Constitution (Article 65). Each state would be governed by the Constitution and the laws it adopted, respecting the constitutional principles of the Union (Article 63). This was the opposite of imperial centralism, under which the provinces had almost no financial autonomy and the government in the Court redistributed at its discretion what it collected.

Intervention as a written exception and as a political instrument

Article 6 tried to protect that autonomy: the federal government could not intervene in matters peculiar to the states, except to repel foreign invasion or invasion of one state by another; to maintain the federative republican form; to restore order and tranquillity at the request of the respective governments; and to ensure the execution of federal laws and judgments. The list is short and looks like a restriction. In the practice of the First Republic, “maintaining the federative republican form” and “restoring order” became clauses open enough to justify interference when the centre and the state oligarchies ceased to understand one another. The decree of 15 November 1889 had already provided for intervention by the Provisional Government where the local government lacked “effective means” to repress disorders. The Constitution gave that language a more civil tone, but it did not remove it.

The 1891 debate: federation or a “confederation of little republics”?

In the Constituent Congress, the sharing of money was, according to the Senate Archive, the hardest-fought clash of the three months of work. The Rio Grande do Sul bench defended a radical federalism: revenues would pass to the local governments and the Union would depend on what the states transferred to it. Júlio de Castilhos argued that granting autonomy without revenue would amount to the “freedom of misery.” Rui Barbosa replied that the Union would be doomed if it came to depend on the states’ “crumbs”: “The states are organs; the Union is the organic aggregate.” Senator José Hygino (Pernambuco) saw in the extreme of the proposal a “confederation of little republics.” The gaucho thesis was defeated by 123 votes to 103.

Nobody came away with everything. The Union kept import duties, and the states received export taxes, “precisely São Paulo’s main demand,” the Senate report observes. The political scientist Christian Lynch, quoted in the same piece, explains the background: in the face of the sugar crisis in the Northeast from the 1870s onwards, the monarchy redistributed to those provinces taxes collected in São Paulo. Republican federalism appealed to São Paulo elites who no longer wanted to see coffee revenue applied in other corners of the Empire.

Asymmetries: the most unequally distributed tax

A recent study in fiscal history, published in the Revista de História Econômica & História de Empresas, describes the 1891 Constitution as a dualist federalism of rigid revenue assignment. According to Affonso de Paula and Marques, three features explain much of what followed. The first is the rigidity of the exclusive lists. The second is the grant to the states of the export tax, “the most unequally distributed base in the country.” The third is the absence of equalization: each unit lived on what it collected, and case-by-case bargaining between the federal Executive and the state oligarchies was the only coordinating mechanism.

The same article notes that, despite Article 9, paragraph 2, and Article 11, the export tax, the states’ main revenue in the period, came to be levied also on interstate operations. Taxing goods that crossed a state line worked, in practice, as state protectionism and shifted the burden onto consumers in other units. The 1934 Constitution had to cap the export tax and expressly forbid interstate charges on the free circulation of goods, a sign that practice had outrun the 1891 design.

To quantify each state’s advantage with precision would require complete revenue series by unit, which the study itself acknowledges it does not provide. The institutional meaning, however, is clear: a coffee-exporting state had a fiscal base that a state with a narrower economy did not. The federation of 1891 decentralized power and revenue without creating any mechanism to correct the inequality that this decentralization laid bare. Autonomy and asymmetry were born together.

— JEFD

Sources

1. Decree No. 1, 15 November 1889. Presidency of the Republic. Available at: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1851-1899/d0001.htm. Accessed 8 November 2026.

2. Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Brazil, 24 February 1891 (original publication). Chamber of Deputies. Available at: https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/consti/1824-1899/constituicao-35081-24-fevereiro-1891-532699-publicacaooriginal-15017-pl.html. Accessed 8 November 2026.

3. WESTIN, Ricardo. “Constituição de 1891: há 130 anos, 1ª Constituinte da República teve queixas da Igreja e ausência do povo.” Senado Notícias / Arquivo S, 5 February 2021. Available at: https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/especiais/arquivo-s/constituicao-de-1891-ha-130-anos-1a-constituinte-da-republica-teve-queixas-da-igreja-e-ausencia-do-povo. Accessed 8 November 2026.

4. AFFONSO DE PAULA, José Enrico Gonçalves; MARQUES, Teresa Cristina de Novaes. “História fiscal e tributária no Brasil republicano (1889-2026): teorias, arquitetura institucional e impactos.” Revista de História Econômica & História de Empresas, v. 29, n. 4, e1174, 2026. Available at: https://www.hehe.org.br/index.php/rabphe/article/download/1174/688. Accessed 8 November 2026.

The author

José Eduardo Figueira Dantas

Editor of Raízes. He writes about politics, culture, faith, family and everyday life from a simple conviction: what is good deserves to be preserved, and what needs to change deserves to be thought through calmly.

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